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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § § 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (appeals 
from circuit courts) and 78-2a-3(2) (f) (appeals from a court 
of record in non-felony criminal cases). Judgment of 
Conviction was entered against the defendant/appellant David 
N. Lynch ("Mr. Lynch)11 for disorderly conduct (an infraction) 
on April 26, 1994 by Judge Joseph I Dimick of the Fourth 
Circuit Court, Utah County. Mr. Lynch's Notice of Appeal was 
filed within 3 0 days later on May 20, 1994. 
Issues on Appeal and Standard of Review 
1. Whether Defendant, by his failure to raise the 
issue of the propriety of the trial court's actions in taking 
note of the evidence previously presented, failed to preserve 
his claim that the trial court committed error. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this 
Court need accord no deference to the ruling of the trial 
court, but should review it for correctness. State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether a trial court judge, who has been 
present and presided over at a jury trial, commits reversible 
error when he takes notice of the facts presented at that 
trial when the matter is subsequently tried to the court 
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without jury, where the court provides an opportunity to both 
sides to present additional evidence beyond that presented in 
the jury trial. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this 
Court need accord no deference to the ruling of the trial 
court, but should review it for correctness. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
3. Whether the evidence in this case is sufficient 
to support the conviction. 
Standard of Review: This is primarily an issue of 
fact. Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Determinative Statutes. Ordinances, and Rules 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must 
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either 
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination 
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
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(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial 
notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory* A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the 
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or 
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as 
conclusive any fact judicially noticed. IN a criminal case, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not 
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
76-9-102. Disorderly Conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order 
of the police to move from a public place, or knowingly 
creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any 
act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
3 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a 
public place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a 
private place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene 
language or makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this 
section, means any place to which the public or a substantial 
group of the public has access and includes but is not limited 
to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, 
hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport 
facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if 
the offense continues after a request by a person to desist. 
Otherwise it is an infraction. 
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Statement of the Case 
1. As a result of an altercation between himself, 
his sons and two American Fork City police officers, Appellant 
David Lynch was charged with violating American Fork City 
Ordinance § 76-8-305, Interference With a Peace Officer, a 
class B misdemeanor. (Addendum 1, Brief of Appellant). 
2. On February 17-18, 1994, a jury trial was held 
on this charge in the Fourth Circuit Court before the 
Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, which trial resulted in a hung 
jury and a mistrial. (Addendum "A", Appellee's Brief). 
3. Subsequently the City amended its information to 
charge Appellant with a violation of American Fork City 
Ordinance § 76-9-102, Disorderly Conduct, an infraction. 
(Addendum 2, Appellant's Brief). 
4. At a hearing on March 23, 1994, the court 
indicated that at the trial set for April 25 it would be 
taking notice of the evidence received at the prior trial. He 
then asked if there was any reason he should not proceed in 
that fashion. Counsel for Defendant indicated that he thought 
that was the correct procedure. (Addendum "B11, Appellee's 
Brief). 
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5. Trial on this charge was held in the Fourth 
Circuit Court before Judge Dimick on April 25, 1994. 
(Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief). 
6. At trial, Judge Dimick took judicial notice of 
the evidence presented at the prior proceeding and afforded 
counsel for both parties an opportunity to present further 
evidence. (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pgs. 2-3). 
7. No objection was made by defense counsel to this 
procedure by Judge Dimick. (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 
3). 
8. Judge Dimick found Appellant guilty as charged 
and fined him $50. (Addendum "C", Appellee's Brief). 
9. Subsequently, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 
and made several claims of error. 
Statement of Facts 
An accurate statement of the facts is difficult if 
not impossible to set forth because the Defendant has failed 
to procure a transcript of the original trial proceeding in 
this matter. However, from the court's statements at the 
trial on April 25, 1994, it is possible to determine the facts 
that the Judge was taking notice of and used in making his 
decision: 
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1. THE COURT: Yeah. The City's testi—the City's 
account of it was that they were having to deal with Mr. 
Lynch7s presence much longer than any simple exchange of "not 
now, later". (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 7 Ins. 8-11). 
2. THE COURT: They say it went on and on at high 
volume. (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 7 Ins. 13-14). 
3. THE COURT: Do I take note of what you want me 
to make note of? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I think so, your Honor. Beyond 
that, I think it's a matter of argument as to the weight or 
the meaning of that evidence as far as this—the theory of the 
charge now. (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 8 Ins. 9-14). 
4. THE COURT: In terms of unreasonable noises in 
a public place, I think they propose that directly. I don't 
have any difficulty construing the meaning of that language so 
that an ongoing, full-voiced, half shouted argument with 
police and conducting an investigation in this busy place is 
capable of carrying that burden of proof for the City. I 
should imagine it would be one of the principal types of 
applications for that language, very easy conclusion for me. 
(Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 15 Ins. 14-21). 
5. THE COURT: With respect to that, most of what 
the defense presented denied continuing, denied the volume 
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too. All parts of what the City presented had to do with them 
having to deal with that and repeated requests to withdraw, to 
retire, to quit, to let them do what they needed to do were 
ignored, while the point was made several times. 
I think the City's carried its burden of proof, Mr. 
Lynch. I return a verdict of guilty as charged. (Addendum 3, 
Appellant's Brief, pg. 17 Ins. 17-24). 
Summary of Argument 
If a defendant fails to raise an issue at trial, he 
is prevented from raising it on appeal. Defendant, by failing 
to raise the issue at trial, has failed to preserve his claim 
that the trial court committed error in taking notice of the 
facts presented at the previous trial. The only exception to 
this rule is where there has been "plain error." A finding of 
plain error requires that the error be obvious and harmful. 
In this case, where the judge, after indicating in 
a prior hearing that he would be taking notice of the facts 
presented at trial, took notice of those facts at the trial 
and then gave the Defendant a full opportunity to present 
evidence, there was no obvious and harmful error. The harm of 
any alleged error was obviated by the judge then allowing the 
Defendant to present evidence. The Defendant, knowing full 
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well what the judge was proposing, then chose not to present 
any evidence. 
Even if this Court reaches the issue of the 
propriety of the trial court taking notice of the previous 
testimony, the trial court's ruling should stand. Rule 
201(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, allows a court to take 
judicial notice of a fact that is "capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned." The trial court took notice of the 
facts that had been presented at trial. These facts were 
capable of accurate and ready determination by reference to 
the tape recording of the original proceeding. The parties 
did not dispute what facts were presented at the original 
trial. The dispute was over the weight to be given to the 
different facts presented at trial. 
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to convict him; however, the Defendant has failed to 
marshall the evidence supporting the conviction. This court 
cannot adequately entertain Defendant's arguments in light of 
Defendant failing to meet his burden in this regard. However, 
even from the record presented, it is clear that there was 
sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of the infraction 
of disorderly conduct. The court specifically found that the 
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Plaintiff met its burden of proof by showing that the 
Defendant, despite repeated requests by officers for the 
Defendant to withdraw from the area while they pursued a 
detention and investigation, made unreasonable noises in a 
public place by willfully carrying on an ongoing, full-voiced, 
half-shouted argument with the police. 
Argument 
I. The Defendant Failed to Preserve for Appeal the Issue of 
the Trial Court Taking Notice of the Previous Testimony 
The Defendant claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it took notice of the facts presented at 
the previous trial. However, the Defendant's failure to 
preserve this issue at trial precludes consideration of the 
issue on appeal. 
It is well established that appellate court will not 
consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised 
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed 
plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993); accord 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 853-854 (Utah 1992). Therefore, 
to ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, 
appellate review of criminal cases in Utah requires that some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made 
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a part of the trial court record before an appellate court 
will review such claim on appeal. State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 
607, 611 (Utah App. 1993); (quoting State v. Johnson , 774 
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)); accord State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). 
It is undisputed that the defendant failed to raise 
any objection at trial regarding the trial court taking 
judicial notice of the facts presented at the previous jury 
trial. In fact, counsel for the Defendant joined with the 
court in a cursory review of the testimony presented at trial. 
By failing to object at trial to the court's actions, 
Defendant is precluded from raising this issue for the first 
time on appeal. 
As noted in the case law set forth above, the only 
exception to the rule requiring the Defendant to raise 
objections at the trial court level is where there is "plain 
error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State 
v. Brown. 856 P.2d at 359. A finding by the court of plain 
error requires that the error be obvious and harmful. State v. 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); accord State v. Eldredqe, 
773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). It is difficult to see how any such 
error was obvious, particularly in light of the language of 
Rule 201(b) (2), Utah Rules of Evidence, which is discussed in 
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detail below. Also, based on the Defendant's attorney's own 
statements, any alleged error was not obvious. When the trial 
court indicated on the hearing on the 23 rd that he would take 
notice of the prior proceedings, attorney for the Defendant 
indicated that he thought that was the correct procedure. 
(Addendum "B", Appellee's Brief pg. 5 Ins. 6-17). 
Additionally, it is difficult to see how the court's 
actions were harmful. The trial court judge observed the 
entire jury trial. He witnessed the demeanor of the witnesses 
as they testified. The defendant was given advance notice, at 
the hearing on March 23rd, that the court would be taking 
notice of the facts presented. The following is an excerpt 
from that hearing: 
THE COURT: Well, what I'd propose to do is to 
set a hearing that will have multiple purposes; the 
first is arraignment that the defendant has 
requested; the second is trial. 
And I intend to take judicial notice of the 
evidence received at the prior trial, which was 
tried in my presence, to allow you further 
opportunity to present evidence if you wish it. I 
would encourage not being duplicative of the prior 
trial. 
Any reason we shouldn't proceed in that 
fashion? 
MR MUSSELMAN: I think that's the correct 
procedure. 
(Transcript of Further Proceedings, March 23, 1994, Addendum 
"B" Appellee's Brief at 5, Ins. 6-17) (Arraignment was on the 
amended charge of disorderly conduct). 
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After taking notice of facts that had been presented 
at trial, the court then gave each party the opportunity to 
present evidence• When presented with the opportunity to 
present evidence, counsel for Defendant simply said, "We're 
prepared to argue it, your Honor." (Transcript of review 
hearing, April 25, 1994, Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief at 3, 
Ins. 5 & 6). 
The Defendant has failed to show what harm there was 
to the defendant by the court's actions. In order for this 
court to address whether the trial court's actions were 
harmful, the Defendant should have provided the court with a 
transcript of the proceedings in the original jury trial. 
Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have 
the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with 
an adequate record. "xAbsent that record Defendant's 
assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which 
the review court has no power to determine.'"State v. Barella, 
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986)(quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 
657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982) , cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983) ) . 
If the court would have had the parties recall their 
witnesses, it is presumed that the witnesses initially 
testified to what they believed was the truth and that there 
testimony would be similar in nature to their original 
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testimony. There is no claim that any of the evidence would 
have changed. That being the case, it does not appear that 
there was any harm in the court proceeding as it did. 
Since any alleged error was not obvious and harmful, 
there was no plain error. And, since this case does not 
involve "exceptional circumstances", which is the other 
exception to preserving an objection on appeal, the 
Defendant's failure to raise the issue at the trial court 
level precludes the issue from being considered on appeal. 
II. The Trial Court Properly took Notice of the Facts 
Presented at the Prior Trial 
The Defendant argues that the rules of evidence 
prevent the court from taking notice of the facts presented at 
the prior trial. The adoption of the current Rules of 
Evidence fundamentally weakens appellant's judicial notice 
argument. The previous Rules of Evidence, Rules 9-12, and the 
Utah Code, Section 78-25-1, had listed a variety of situations 
in which judicial notice was permitted. Many of these rules 
were themselves codified from previous common law developments 
cited by appellant. The adoption of the current Rule 201, 
however, superseded these rules and "consolidate[d] the law of 
judicial notice . . . into one broadly defined rule." UTAH R. 
EVID. 2 01 adv. cmtee. note. The resolution of this issue 
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therefore turns on a construction of the language of the 
current rule and not on prior case law relying on superseded 
statutes. See Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (recognizing that the rule allowing "judicial notice of 
the records and prior proceedings in the same case" relied on 
a superseded statute, while also citing to a case which 
assumed the propriety of taking judicial notice of a previous 
action). 
Rule 201(b)(2) states that "[a] judicially noticed 
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it 
is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." 
The trial court complied with this Rule because: (1) it took 
judicial notice of the fact of the evidence presented in the 
previous trial and not of the facts which this evidence was 
presented to prove; (2) this fact was "capable of accurate and 
ready determination" by resort to the tape recordings of the 
proceedings, which could have been listened to by the judge, 
or reduced to transcript form and read by the judge; (3) the 
tape recording of the trial is a "source whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned"; (4) the facts noticed are therefore 
"not subject to reasonable dispute" within the meaning of this 
rule; and (5) both plaintiff and defendant had "opportunity to 
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be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed." 
First, the trial court took notice not of the facts 
at issue but of the fact of the evidence presented in the 
previous trial. The transcript reflects the following 
conversation: 
THE COURT: How do you want to proceed? 
MR HANSEN: It's my understanding that you're 
going to take judicial notice of everything that 
has occurred in the trial; that being the case, the 
City has no further evidence to present and would 
rest. 
THE COURT: Mr. Musselman? 
MR MUSSELMAN: We're prepared to argue it, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let's just make sure that I 
know what I'm taking judicial notice of. That's the 
way I prefer to proceed. 
The evidence began with . . . 
THE COURT: Is there any other portion of the 
presentation of your case you wish me to take 
notice of? 
MR HANSEN: No, I think that's about it. 
THE COURT: How about the defense? 
MR MUSSELMAN: I think that's essentially it. 
If I remember Officer Falslev's testimony 
correctly, . . . 
THE COURT: Do I take note of what you want me 
to make note of? 
MR MUSSELMAN: I think so, Your Honor. Beyond 
that, I think it's a matter of argument as to the 
weight or the meaning of that evidence as far as 
this—the theory of the charge now. 
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(Transcript of Review Hearing of April 25, 1994, Addendum 3, 
Appellant's Brief at 2 In. 24 to 3 In. 10; id. at 6 In 22 to 
7 In. 2; 8 Ins. 9-14.) The trial court was quite clearly 
taking notice of the fact that the evidence had been presented 
and not of the facts in dispute. Rather, the court decided 
the disputed facts on the basis of the evidence of which 
judicial notice had been taken. Contrary to appellant's 
assertion, the fact judicially noticed—the prior testimony— 
was not "hotly disputed" but was concluded by both sides after 
each had summarized and discussed it in open court. The 
dispute over "the weight or the meaning of that evidence" does 
not create a dispute over its prior admission into evidence. 
Second, the fact that the testimony was offered was 
"capable of accurate and ready determination" by resort to the 
tape recording of the prior trial. The parties' failure to 
actually consult the recording or have it reduced to 
transcript form does not offend this provision. Appellant's 
arguments in this regard are somewhat disingenuous. Appellant 
speaks of a transcription as something "required by Rule 
201(b)(2)," but this requirement appears neither in the text 
of the rule nor in the cases cited. He cites Riche v. Riche, 
784 P. 2d 4 65 (Utah App. 1989) in support of this argument. 
However, Riche interpreted Rule of Evidence 201(d) which deals 
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with mandatory judicial notice, and the fulfilling of 
requirements which make a court's taking judicial notice of 
facts mandatory, such as the requesting party supplying a 
transcript to the trial court. Id. at 468. In the instant 
case, the trial court used its discretion to take judicial 
notice of the prior proceedings as allowed by Utah Rule of 
Evidence 201(c). The lack of a transcript immediately 
available is therefore, not error. Also, a transcript could 
have been produced, if counsel for both parties and the court 
deemed it necessary to determine the accuracy of what was 
noticed. However, neither party nor the court was troubled 
with the accuracy of what was judicially noticed and neither 
counsel objected to the trial court's action. Therefore, 
because there was no reasonable dispute as to the facts 
judicially noticed, and the accuracy of those facts could have 
been determined by sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 
questioned, Rule 2 01 was satisfied and the trial court did not 
err. The Defendant also cites Matthews, but Matthews holds in 
relevant part that a judge cannot take judicial notice of a 
fact for which no adequate transcript exists. Matthews v. 
State, 839 P. 2d 1215 (Idaho 1992) . In Matthews, the court was 
concerned that the trial judge had taken judicial notice of a 
fact from a case nine years old, for which an incomplete 
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transcript was available (one day of thirteen) . Id. The court 
was also concerned that even a complete transcript would not 
have supported the fact noticed: adequacy of counsel. Id. 
Unlike Matthews, an adequate transcript was available in this 
case which the parties and the judge could have consulted to 
determine any dispute, and the transcript would have revealed 
the type of information sought—the facts were therefore 
capable of accurate and ready determination. In short, 
neither Rule 201 (b) (2) nor the cited case law supports 
appellant's apparent demand that the transcript actually be 
placed before the trial court. 
Third, a trial transcript is a "source whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." As mentioned 
above, Utah courts have regularly taken judicial notice of 
judicial transcripts. Fourth, the facts noticed are therefore 
"not subject to reasonable dispute" within the meaning of this 
rule. The phrasing of this rule suggests that no reasonable 
dispute exists where the facts noticed are "capable of 
accurate and ready determination . . . " In any case, 
appellant does not challenge the accuracy of the fact of the 
testimony of which the trial judge took notice. Finally, both 
plaintiff and defendant had "opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
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matter noticed." The excerpts of the transcript quoted above 
illustrate the trial judge7s efforts to ensure that each side 
agreed both to the propriety of the action and to "the tenor 
of the [testimony] noticed." Appellant had adequate notice of 
the court's intent to take judicial notice from the March 23, 
1994 hearing, as indicated in the following dialogue: 
THE COURT: Well, what I'd propose to do is to 
set a hearing that will have multiple purposes; the 
first is arraignment that the defendant has 
requested; the second is trial. 
And I intend to take judicial notice of the 
evidence received at the prior trial, which was 
tried in my presence, to allow you further 
opportunity to present evidence if you wish it. I 
would encourage not being duplicative of the prior 
trial. 
Any reason we shouldn't proceed in that 
fashion? 
MR MUSSELMAN: I think that's the correct 
procedure. 
(Transcript of Further Proceedings, March 23, 1994, Addendum 
"B", Appellee's Brief at 5, Ins. 6-17.) 
In short, Rule 201 now allows a court to take 
judicial notice of previous proceedings in other actions. 
This court has exercised this power on at least one occasion, 
see State v. Ewell. 883 P.2d 1360 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (taking 
judicial notice of transcript from another trial), and has 
discussed appellate judicial notice under the assumption that 
notice could be taken of previous actions, see Mel Trimble 
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. , 758 P.2d 451 (Utah Ct. 
20 
App. 1988) (discussing at length the issue of taking judicial 
notice of the record from a previous action on an appeal from 
a subsequent action); see also id. at 455 (discussing, in the 
context of collateral estoppel, the burden "to produce the 
record of the prior proceeding [and] urge the court to take 
judicial notice of it"). As illustrated by this analysis and 
these examples, the prior common law and statutory lists of 
matters proper for judicial notice have been supplanted by the 
general rule established in Rule 201. The facts noticed in 
this case meet every requirement of this Rule. 
III. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Conviction 
A. Defendant has Failed to Marshall the Evidence 
The Defendant's final argument is that the evidence 
is insufficient to support a conviction. In challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the Defendant has a heavy burden. 
He must marshall all evidence supporting the jury's verdict 
and must then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient 
to support the verdict even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 472 
(Utah App. 1991) (erupting State v. Purdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 
(Utah App. 1991)); accord Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 
P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). Defendant fails to meet this 
burden. He completely fails to marshall the evidence 
21 
supporting the judge's verdict and, consequently, fails to 
show how it is insufficient to support the verdict. 
As has been discussed previously in this brief, 
parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have 
the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with 
an adequate record. Ifx Absent that record Defendants 
assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which 
the review court has no power to determine.'"State v. Barella. 
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986)(quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 
657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982) , cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983) ) . 
In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this court can 
only assume the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet 
v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) Cert, denied 
493 U.S. 1033 (1990); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1986). 
The Defendant has failed to provide the court with 
an adequate transcript of the proceedings below and has failed 
to marshall the evidence presented to the trial court. As 
such, the defendant has failed to carry his burden on appeal 
and the conviction of Defendant of disorderly conduct should 
stand. 
22 
B. The Evidence Supports the Conviction 
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
on two grounds. First, appellant states that since the only 
evidence offered was that judicially noticed, and since this 
evidence was improperly noticed, there is no evidence at all 
to support the charge. Since the evidence was properly 
noticed as discussed above, this claim fails. 
Second, appellant argues that even the evidence 
judicially noticed was insufficient to support the conviction 
because it did not show intent. There was sufficient evidence 
in the record, however, to show that appellant's conduct 
exhibited the prohibited mental state. The trial court based 
the conviction on American Fork's enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-102(1)(b) (ii), which states in relevant part that 
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if . . . 
Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . 
. He makes unreasonable noises in a public place. 
The trial court took notice that the officers had testified 
that they dealt wit Mr. Lynch "much longer than any simple 
exchange of 'not now, later," and that "it went on and on at 
high volume." (Transcript of Review Hearing of April 25, 
1994, Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief at 7 Ins. 8-14; see also 
id. at 5:17-22.) 
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This evidence is adequate to show intent. The trial 
court could believe from this evidence that Mr. Lynch had a 
"conscious objective or desire to cause public inconvenience." 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(1) . Even if Mr. Lynch were not 
intending to cause public inconvenience, he also "recklessly 
creat[ed] a risk" of "public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm." Mr. Lynch was reckless as to creating this risk 
because (1) by repeatedly asking him to withdraw, (see Hearing 
Transcript, Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief at 17 Ins. 18-22), 
the officers made him aware of the risk, (2) because the same 
requests indicate that the risk was substantial and 
unjustifiable, (3) because his repeated confrontation after 
requests to withdraw indicate that he consciously disregarded 
that risk, and (4) because persisting loudly to confront 
police officers after the requests to withdraw is "of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all of the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(3) 
(defining reckless conduct as that occurring "when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
24 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.11) The 
officers7 testimony on these points was sufficient to allow 
the judge to find that intent had been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, American Fork City requests that 
the trial court7s decision be affirmed. 
DATED this 9 7 ^ 1A day of March, 1995. 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
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James D. Gilson 
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Addendum Index 
A. February 18, 1994 Transcript of end of jury-
trial. (Original of Transcript filed in Court of Appeals as 
part of the record on appeal.) 
B. March 23, 1994 Hearing Transcript of further 
proceedings in Trial Court (Original of Transcript filed in 
Court of Appeals as part of the record on appeal.) 




























IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
OREM DEPARTMENT 
-oOc-




Case Nc. 931-1064 
_ f-s_ C\ fS « . 
V ^ V P - p ~ : *- -* f ^ i : ^ 3 , C t ~ C ~ V73.3 V - "* d '-.,» £ ~. " -3 t h . 6 
zzr.'^Q'O ZTZ? T -' "fp CTT-^TT T ^ T \ ' "" ~ T - - • - - - ' -> 
r?.« -^ -1- v 
For the Defendant 
-/ ruMi O - w'~ A i A *1 A u M i l 
Harding S Associates 
306 West Main 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney at Law 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 34601 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R. 
3241 SOUTH 4340 WEST 



























P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The Court's record will reflect that 
the jury has returned, I think without a verdict; that 
Counsel and Mr. Lynch is present. 
Who of you is acting as foreperson? 
MR. PORTER: I was, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is it so, Mr. Porter, that you haven't 
been able to reach a verdict? 
MR. PORTER: That's correct. 
that there are at least some of you who tnin/i tnat further 
rime would nor be profitable. 
MR. PORTER: Yes. We--
THS COURT: - Let me ask you thaz individually. 
MR. PORTER:"* The jury was evenly divided and--
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PORTER: --all parties definite that they 
couldn't change their mind. 
THE COURT: That—have a chair for just one moment 
and let me ask that individually. 
LaRae Croft, are you of the opinion that more time 
would not help this jury reach a verdict? 
MS. CROFT: I am. 



























t h a t more .time would not help t h i s j u ry reach a v e r d i c t ? 
MR. GREEN: Yes. 
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COURT: And Mr. Seegmiller? 
5EEGMILLER: Yes. 
COURT: Okay. Let me make a 
you so you don't leave here ' 
: it. That's a fair thing fo 
ought to take your best shot at coming 
as the instructions told you and I hea 
self and that's one possible outcome. 
. ycu have f ?•• ^ Sf 3 4r- 12 —• v v- C* C! *} .i. -•"^  ** 
If that's where you are in your * 
„ that's where you are and that doesn't 
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was able to answer the question. I think I would have had 
to think about.it. 
That concludes your service. We appreciate it. 
If any of these parties want to talk to you about how you 
saw the case or how the panel saw the case, you do not have 
to answer any of those questions. If you want to, that's 
okay, that's entirely your decision. 
That does conclude your service. We appreciate 
it. You're excused. 
MR. PORTER: Do you want the instructions back? 
mrrr* r»OTTpm . V a c r J = -• • f J "'^^-^^ *- V a-n --- — V. — V -* 
clerk. Thank you. 
What's the City's intention for the prosecution? 
MR. HANSEN: Let me--let rr\e--can I have seme time 
_c iriiiiA a^uUu it. l Con ~ jvi*«~ * J- i. i wa.nu 10 j-cur/ iu, - -. * 
just ask the officer and--
TKE COURT: Do ycu want me to give it a particular 
day for further proceedings? 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: If we do, if you don't want to, we. can 
just call it off. 
MR. HANSEN: What I was thinking is that maybe in 
terms of plea negotiations at this point, ...(inaudible) 
certainly infraction, disorderly conduct or something. 
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5 I 1/ Toni Frye, do hereby certify that I am a 
6 transcriber*for Penny C. Abbott, Certified Shorthand 
7 Reporter, and Certified Court Transcriber cf tape recorded 
8 court proceedings; that I received.the copy cf the 
9 electronically recorded tape cf the within matter and under 
10 her supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, 
11 and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 tc 5, inclusive, t 
12 the best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
13 transcription, except where it is indicated the tape 
14 recorded ccurt proceedings were inaudible* 
15 I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
16 attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
17 stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
18 party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
19 DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 27th day cf 
20 September >. 1994. 




























C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, PENNY C. ABBOTT, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the copy of the 
electronically recorded tape (No. 37) in the matter of 
American Fork City, plaintiff, vs. David Lynch, defendant, 
and that I caused it to be transcribed into typewriting, and 
that a full, true and correct transcription of said hearing 
so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing 
pages numbered from 1 to 5, inclusive, and that said pages 
constitute an accurate and complete transcription of all the 
proceedings adduced at the hearing and contained on the tape 
except where it is indicated that the tape recorded court 
proceedings were inaudible. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 27th day of September, 1S94. 
•^^M^^^M^^^^^' ~- Penny C ..-Abbott, C.S.R 
dos^it 
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My commission expires: Sept. 24, 1995 
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named Court, and that the following proceedings were had. 
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Fcr the Defendant: 
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSSII 
Harding & Associates 
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Attorney at Law 
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THE COURT; I think I would prefer to settle the 
evidence and invite him in, just to avoid that. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Okay. I apologize if I 
misunderstood. My~~I got the message from my secretary, 
that (inaudible) struck the jury trial, but he wants us to 
be there for a pretrial anyway. 
lnii ^ uUux . riex x , no, x wa^ > juSu .^.x*i^.-i.-.*^  u*-.a~ 
it's harmless; jeopardy doesn't attach before. It's a 
simple thing to conduct arraignment or waiver on the new 
charges and to have the trial, was my purpose. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: -e just got the message wrong. 
But I agree with-
TKE COURT: Oh, I can see that. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, that may have been 
Bonnie's understanding, when ycu told--fca^se when I talked 
tc Bonnie, she said, I called and tcld them that the trial 
is off. I asked--
THE COURT: The jury is off. Well--
MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, on one end or the other or 
both. 
THE COURT: I grant American Fork City's motion to 
amend to an infraction of disorderly conduct. What's the 
elements of the charge? Violent, tumultuous or threatening 
behavior? 
MR. JKANSEN: Right. Or making unreasonable noises 
3 
! in a public place. I don't believe that there were any 
2 allegations of abusive or obscene language or obscene 
3 gestures, so that would be the--
4 J MR. MUSSELMAN: Looks like intent to cause public 
5 j inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, and engaged in fighting 
6 i or violent, tumultuous or threatening--
7 THE COURT: Or other violent — 
8 j M R- MUSSELMAN: --or made unreasonable noises in z 
g j public place. It talks about private places; doesn't apply. 
10 I " r eri3ased in abusive or cbscer.e language or made obscene 
.... gestures. 
12 | MR. HANSEN: (Inaudible) 










15 , THE COURT: Skip the black 
MR. MUSS2LMATJ: Let's see no«, it says ordinances 
of American Fork City, but the Code section seems to 
18 j duplicate the--
19 J MR. HANSEN: The City has adopted the State Code 
and adopted an ordinance allowing us to cite specifically to 
the State Code. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: So, 96-S-102 UCA would be 
identical to--to the American Fork City ordinance. 
THE COURT: The .American Fork City ordinance 
doesn't promulgate'.the--the~or republish the State, does 
4 
j I it? It just adopts it 
2 J MR. HANSEN: Yeah. Just adopts it and indicates 
3 I that you can charge by the cite (inaudible). 
4 J MR- MUSSELMAN; I ?m glad they did that. It sure 
_ . makes it more convenient, make mere sense 
o 
6 I THE COURT: Well, what I'd propose to do is to set 
a hearing that will have multiple purposes; the first is 




















4- ~ 4 ~ 1 
And I intend to take judicial notice of the 
evidence received at the prior trial, which was tried in my 
evidence if you wish it. I would encourage not being 
duplicative of the prior trial. 
Any reason we shouldn't proceed in that fashion? 
ilR . r i */ w i^  £L ^ i*-*** . - ui.4j.IlA, ^*xciu i w.**e C O - T S v ^ 
procedure. 
THE COURT: Won't take very long, will it? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I don't think so. I suppose it's 
possible that there may be (inaudible) evidence over my 
objection. 
THE COURT: I think you would expect the City to 
MR. HANSEN: I have nothing further to present. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: No. I say over my objection from 
5 
1 (inaudible) again. 
2 THE COURT: We oan do it fairly short. We have an 
3 11:00 o'clock time .open on Monday, the 4th of April. That 
4 would be a week from next Monday. 
5 MR. MUSSELMAN: I--letfs see, at 11:00? 
6 THE COURT: Monday's one of the days you want? 
7 MR. HANSEN: Monday or Thursdays are good for me, 
8 yes; the Circuit Court has (Inaudible) 
9 MR. MUSSELMAN: I think I--I?m a little tight that 
10 day; come from Spanish—Springville and going back to 
11 Spanish, it's a little tight. I think I'd rather not run 
12 the risk of beiiig late — 
13 THE COURT: We can do it Thursday of that week at 
14 1:00 o'clock, Thursday the 7th. 
15 MR. MUSSELMAN: I'm up in Salt Lake in a jury 
I t „ J - ^  — ** ** 4-1 .4- J — -. 
17 THE COURT: We car. dc it Thursday the 14th at 1:0 
18 o'clock. 
19 MR. MUSSELMAN: I'm in trial in Fillmore that day 
20 Sorry to be so impossible. 
21 What's April 11th? Is that a holiday? I don't 
22 have anything on my schedule that day, I was just wondering 
23 if there's a good reason. 
24 THE COURT: No. There's not. 
25 MR. MUSSELMAN: Could we do it April 11th? 
6 
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t STATE OF UTAH 
S3 
una^ a iui :ect transcription cf said hearing 
COUNTY CF SALT LAKE } 
I, PENNY C. ABECTT, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the copy of the 
electronically recorded tape (No. SC) in the matter of 
American Fork City, plaintiff, vs. David Lynch, defendant, 
and that I caused it to be transcribed into typewriting, and 
d 
so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing 
pages numbered from 1 to 7, inclusive, and that said pages 
constitute an accurate and complete transcription of all the 
proceedings adduced at the hearing and contained on the tape 
except where it is indicated that the tape recorded court 
proceedings were inaudible. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 27th day cf September, 13S4. 
aas/^a 
b b o t t , C .S .R. 
L i c e n s e #93 
My commission expires: Sept. 24, 1996 
Addendum "C" 
Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF AMERICAN FORK CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
LYNCH, DAVID N CASE NO: 931001064 
30 E 300 N DOB: / / 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003 TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 04/26/94 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-9-102 DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 50.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS; 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 37.04 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 35% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 12.96 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 50.00 
TRACKING; 
Fine Stay 04/30/94 
POCKET INFORMATION; 
Chrg: DISORDLY CONDUCT Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
Fine Amount: 50.00 Suspended: .00 
Fines and assessments entered: FN 37.04 
SL 12.96 
50.00 
Total fines and assessments..: 
BY JTHE COURT l& 
GE, CIRCUIT C 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
